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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 13-3699 
________________ 
 
NEAL HAMMILL; 
AMY JO HAMMILL, 
On behalf of Themselves and 
All Others Similarly Situated, 
        Appellants 
 
v. 
 
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. 
 
________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-12-cv-00117) 
District Judge: Honorable Joy Flowers Conti 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 12, 2014 
 
Before: AMBRO and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
and RESTANI,* Judge 
 
(Filed : June 17, 2014) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION   
________________ 
 
                                              
* Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge, United States Court of International Trade, sitting by 
designation. 
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AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
 Neal and Amy Jo Hammill appeal from the District Court’s dismissal of their class 
action lawsuit against Bank of America, N.A., for violations of Pennsylvania’s Loan 
Interest and Protection Law, 41 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 101 et seq. (“Act 6”), and for tortious 
interference.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm.1  
I. Background 
 The Hammills owned a home in North East, Pennsylvania.  Bank of America was 
the servicer on their mortgage.  When the Hammills defaulted on their mortgage, Bank of 
America sent them a pre-foreclosure notice.  The notice advised the Hammills that they 
could cure their default and avoid foreclosure by mailing to a law firm in Philadelphia the 
overdue amount (about $12,500) by cashier’s check, certified check, or money order.  
When the Hammills failed to cure the default, Bank of America filed a foreclosure action 
in state court in Pennsylvania.  Within seven months of filing the foreclosure action, 
Bank of America voluntarily dismissed the action without prejudice. 
 Soon after the dismissal, the Hammills filed this putative class action lawsuit.  
They alleged that Bank of America violated Act 6 and tortiously interfered with their 
mortgage contract by failing to notify them that they could cure their default by cash 
payment.2  According to the Hammills, before filing a foreclosure action, §§ 403 and 
404(b)(1) of Act 6 require lenders to issue a “Notice of Intention to Foreclose” that 
                                              
1 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
2 The Hammills also alleged violations of the Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency 
Law, 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1680.403c, but do not appeal dismissal of that claim.  They 
similarly do not appeal the dismissal of their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. 
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explains to borrowers that they may cure default by tendering all amounts due “in the 
form of cash, cashier’s check or certified check.”  41 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 404(b)(1) 
(emphasis added).  Because Bank of America failed to notify buyers that they could cure 
default by a cash payment, its foreclosure action was allegedly prohibited by Act 6.  Of 
significance to this appeal, the Hammills did not allege they could have cured their 
default by making a cash payment.  The only damages claimed by them were the 
attorneys’ fees and costs they incurred in defending the “illegal” foreclosure action in 
state court. 
 The District Court granted Bank of America’s motion to dismiss the complaint 
with prejudice.  It held that the Hammills’ Act 6 claim failed because they did not plead 
legally cognizable damages under the Act.  The District Court also noted, when 
determining whether to grant the Hammills leave to amend their complaint, that they 
“failed to allege that there was a causal connection between the purported defect in [Bank 
of America’s] pre-foreclosure notice and their payment of attorney’s fees to defend 
against the foreclosure action.”  Hammill v. Bank of America, N.A., 2013 WL 4648317, at 
*6 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2013).  The Hammills timely filed this appeal. 
II. Standard of Review 
 “Our review of a motion to dismiss is plenary.”  Nuveen Mun. Trust ex rel. Nuveen 
High Yield Mun. Bond Fund v. WithumSmith Brown, P.C., 692 F.3d 283, 293 (3d Cir. 
2012).  “We ‘accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and all 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them, and we affirm the order of dismissal 
only if the pleading does not plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’”  Id. (quoting 
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Fellner v. Tri–Union Seafoods, L.L.C., 539 F.3d 237, 242 (3d Cir. 2008)).  “The 
plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a 
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).  Factual 
allegations need only “raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Twombly, 550 
U.S. at 555, though we “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a 
factual allegation.”  Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).  “[W]e can affirm on 
any basis appearing in the record.”  Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, Del., 
Inc., 450 F.3d 130, 133 (3d Cir. 2006).   
III. Analysis 
 On appeal, the opening brief of the Hammills focuses exclusively on challenging 
the District Court’s conclusion that they failed to plead damages.  While we make no 
determination as to the correctness of that conclusion by the Court, we affirm for the 
independent reason that the Hammills failed to allege there was a causal connection 
between Bank of America’s failure to disclose that they could cure their default by cash 
payment and any injury or damages they suffered. 
 Section 504 of Act 6 provides that “[a]ny person affected by a violation of the act 
shall have the substantive right to bring an action . . . for damages by reason of 
such . . . violation . . .”  41 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 504.   Under its plain language, the Hammills 
may only bring suit if Bank of America’s violation of the Act actually caused some 
injury.  Cf. In re Smith, 866 F.2d 576 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding a private right of action 
where lender sent notice of foreclosure to incorrect address in violation of Act 6 and the 
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borrower, on learning of the foreclosure action, immediately attempted to cure the 
default).  In their complaint, the Hammills allege no connection between Bank of 
America’s violation of Act 6 and their damages.  Specifically, they do not allege that, had 
they been informed that they could cure their default by a cash payment, they would have 
done so, thereby preventing a foreclosure action and the associated attorneys’ fees. 
 Given the Hammills’ failure to plead a sufficient causal connection, their Act 6 
claim was properly dismissed.  Their tortious interference claim (based on Bank of 
America’s sending an “illegal” pre-foreclosure notice in violation of the Hammills’ 
contract with the holder of their mortgage) similarly fails to allege that the technical 
defect in the pre-foreclosure notice was causally related to the Hammills’ alleged 
damages in any way. 
 For these reasons, we affirm. 
 
